Carna L. Peterson v. David H. Carter and Janet S. Carter et al : Brief of Defendants-Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1977
Carna L. Peterson v. David H. Carter and Janet S.
Carter et al : Brief of Defendants-Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Dave McNullin; Attorney for Defendants-Respondents;
Howard, Lewis & Petersen; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellants;
Steven Scheendinen; Attorney for Intervenor;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Peterson v. Carter, No. 15310 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/729
IN T~E SUPREIE COURT 
Or THE STATE or UTAH 
CARNA L. PETERSON, by LARRY 
BROADHEAD, Guardian, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs 
DAVID H. CARTER and JANET S. 
CARTER, 
Oefandanta-Reepondent, 
STATE or UTAH, by and through 
UTAH STAT£ DEPARTmENT or 
SOCIAL SERVICE, 
Intervenor. 
Case No. 15,310 
BRIEr or OEFENDANTS-RESPONDEIT' 
APPEAL FROm JUDGmENT Or THE FOUftTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE or UTAH, 
JUDGE J. ROBERT BULLOCK 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 [est 300 North 
P~ovo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellants 
Steven Schwendiman 
231 £eat 400 south 
salt Lake City, utah 84111 
Attorney for Intervenor 
Dave llclu1lin 
City Office aulldlnt 
P.o. Box 176 
P~yeon, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defeh~ 
Respondent.• 
FILED 
NOV - 4 llj/1 
_,....----··--····-·-·----------
Ciorlr. s....- c-t. Ut8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREmE COURT 
Of THE STATE Of UTAH 
CARNA L. PETERSON, by LARRY 
BROADHEAD, Guardian, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs 
DAVID H, CARTER end JANET S. 
CARTER, 
Defendants-Respondent, 
STATE Of UTAH, by end through 
UTAH STATE DEPARTmENT or 
SOCIAL SERVICE, 
Intervenor. 
Case No. 15,310 
BRIEF Of DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
APPEAL fROm JUDGmENT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
JUDGE J. ROBERT BULLOCK 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellants 
Steven Schwendimen 
231 East 400 South 
salt Lake City, utah B4111 
Attorney for Intervenor 
Dave mcmullin 
City Office Building 
P.O. Box 176 
P~yson, Utah 84651 
Attorney for Oefendenta-
Respondents 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
........................ l 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT •••••••••.••.•••••••• 1 
STATEMENT OF fACTS 
................................. 2 
ARGUmENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT, SITTING IN EQUITY, SHOULD NOT 
DISTURB THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT BUT 
SHOULD SUSTAIN THEm AS A PROPER APPLICATION Of 
THE LAW TO THE ESTABLISHED FACTS........... 4 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
GRANTOR HAD SUFfiCIENT MENTAL CAPACITY AT THE 
TIME Of EXECUTION OF THE DEED ••••••••••••• 5 
a. Test of Capacity ................... , 5 
b. Prior and Subsequent Evidence ••••••• B 
c. Lucid Intervals ..... , ........ , • • • • • • 9 
d, Procedure • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 10 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY fOUND THERE WAS 
NO UNDUE INFLUENCE OVER MRS. PETERSON 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW APPELLANT TO 
mAINTAIN A VEXATIOUS SUIT IN WHICH HE HAS 
NO STANDING AND IS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN 
INTEREST ••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••• • • 
STATE OF UTAH , , ................... • .. • • .. • 
11 
CONCLUSION ••••••••••••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • · • • • • • • • • 
12 
14 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Anderson v. Thomes, 108 Utah 252, 159 P.2d 142 (1945) ••••.• 5~ 
Anheuser-Bush, Inc. v. Sterle§, 28 Cal.2d 347, 170 P. 2 d 448 ' 
166 ALR 1 8 (1946) ..... , ...... , ....... : 11 
Armstrorgv. Anderson, 471 P.2d 326 (Okl. 1966} ••••••.••••••• 5, 
Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710(1965).,,
11
' 
Brown v. Board of Education of morgen Co. School Dist., . 
560 P.2d 1129 (Uhb,l~71~ ............... 5 
Burgess v. Colby, 93 Utah 103, 71 P.2d 185 (1937) ........... 10 
Caughey v. George Jenson end Sons, 74 Idaho 132, 258 P.2d 
357 (1953) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ;)4 
Cornie v. Cornie, 80 Utah 486, 15 P.2d 631 (1932) ••••••••••• 5 
Crumley v. Smith, 397 P.2d 119 (Okl. 1964) .................. 12 
Cutler v. Bowen, 10 Cel.App.2d 31, 51 P.2d 164 (1935) •••• ,5 
Estey v. Heughien, 112 mont. 36, 113 P.2d 325 (1941) ........ 6 I 
Hackett v. Hackett, 429 P.2d 753 (Okl. 1967) ................ 11 
Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 216, 148 P. 433 (1914) ••••••••••••• 5 
Higgins v. Pipkin, 360 P.2d 231 (Okl. 1961) ................. 11 
mathews v. Pederson, 204 Okl. 687, 133 P. 2d 971 (1951} .... ,4,i 
matter of Woodward, 549 P.2d 1207 (Okl. 1976) ............... 5,!1 
Pailhe v. Peilhe, 247 P. 2d 838 (Cel.App. 1952) ............. 12 
Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P. 2d 1110 (Utah 1977) ••••••.•• ,5 
state ex.rel. Gebardt v. Su~erior Court for Kin~ Co., 
15 was 2d 673, 131. P.2d 9 3(1942) ..... 13 
state ex.rel. Harp v. Wilson, 17 Wash. 670, 137 P.2d 105 
( 1943) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 13 
Tate v. murphy, 202 Okl. 671, 217 P.2d 177 1 18 ALR.2d 892 
(1950) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ,,,B,Ii 
Westover v. Harris, 47 N.m. 112, U7 P.2d 177 (1943) ........ 10 
Wilson v. Sampson, 91 Cal.App.2d 953, 205 P.2d 753 (1949) .. ,5,1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
23 AmJUR 2d Deeds sec. 66 Et seq. 
59 Am JUR 2d Reel Party in Interest sec. 38 Et seq. 
1 CJS Actions Sec. 21 
~ 
12 
13 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is a suit brought by the guardian of c 
arna Peter! 
plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter referred to as a p p e 11 an t ) , tc 
vacate a deed on the basis of said person's alleged in ' 
competan1 
and of alleged undue influence exercised over her by the d 
efantt 
respondents (hereinafter referred to as respondents) at th . 
e t1: 
of execution of her warranty deed to respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After having heard the evidence and arguments of 
counsel, and having taken the matter under advisement, the 
court ruled that the appellant herein failed to establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence the invalidity of the warren~, 
dead dated September 2, 1975, by which respondents acquired 
subject property. Based primarily upon the testimony of milto· 
T. Harmon, Esq., the court found that the grantor in said deac 
knew and understood the nature of the transaction, the lien 
position of the State of Utah, and the consequential limitatio1 
on benefits to be derived by her from a sale of her property, 
The court further ruled that the evidence did not s~ 
that the respondents defrauded the grantor or the state of u~ 
I 
over-reached, exerted duress or undue influence, or otherwise 
committed any unlawful act in negotiating for and acq~iring 
said property. 
( 1) 
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STATEmENT OF FACTS 
In 1972, it came to the knowledge of the respondents 
that mrs. Peterson wanted them to have her home. After 
extensive groundwork had been laid respondents were told that 
mrs. Peterson had changed her mind. Her family disapproved of 
the sale. (R.l62) 
Sometime later mrs. Peterson moved from her home to 
her daughter Anna's and several months later to the Colonial 
manor Resthome in Nephi, Utah. The home in question was left 
vacant from 1973 to September 1975. 
generally run down. (R.209) 
Its condition became 
Along in August of 1975 respondents were egein contacted 
and told that mrs. Peterson wanted them to coma in end sea her 
because her house was deteriorating, no one was living in it, 
her garden wasn't being taken care of end she wanted to go 
ahead with the sale. (R.l7l) Before visiting mrs. Paterson, 
respondents contacted Larry Broadhead, (later appointed mrs. 
Paterson's guardian), to tell him what mrs. Peterson wanted and 
that respondents didn't went any hard feelings or any problems 
with mrs. Peterson's family. Larry Broadhead said that he had 
no objections end that he wouldn't become involved with it.(R.l7l, 
172). 
Upon respondent's request, milton Harmon, Esq., end 
Dave Gowers, the state Welfare agent, met with mrs. Peterson 
and explained what financial implications the sale would have. 
(2) 
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milton Harmon was acquainted with mrs Pete • f . 
• rson s am~ly end 
had represented them on previous occasions. (R.l73) After meet 
with Mrs. Peterson, Mr. Hermon called Anna Broadhead, mrs, 
Peterson's closest living relative, to inform her of the Pla~ 
to purchase the property and to ask if there were b · 
any o Jecta 
Anna celled Mr. Hermon back to inform him that she thought it 
would be best to sell the property. (R.Bl) 
On the following day, September 2, 197S, Mil ton Hermc 
brought the deed to the resthome and mrs. Peterson conveyed tn, 
subject property to the respondents. At that time the state 
Welfare Department had a lien on the property and intended to 
give mrs. Peterson Sl,OOD.DO for any sale of the property for 
her funeral expenses. The remainder would go to the State to 
release their lien. 
Sherman Peterson was requested by the State to apprai 
the value of the land. (R.209) He quoted the state a figure c 
S3,2DO.OD. (R.210) The respondents paid the appraisal figure 
and the State released its lien on the 70 year old, four room 
home. ( R. 107) 
After conveyance of the deed, respondents set about 
to repair the home, first they replumbed the entire house. 
Then they put in new floors, lowered the ceiling, paneled wal. 
repaired window and door frames, painted, rewired, aug a new 
cesspool (R.lB7), cleaned out old trees and fences, hauled oN 
garbage (R.lBB). On November 22, 1975 respondents were notif: 
of a pending action against them. They immediately ceased wo:. 
( 3) 
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on their home, as thai · 
r investment in time and money was 
considerable. 
On the 19th of December, 1975, Larry Broadhead brought 
suit as newly appointed guardian for mrs. Peterson. He alleged 
that mrs. Peterson was incompetent at the t· 1me of the transaction, 
that she had received less than full considerat 1· 0 n for the property, 
and that the respondents had exercised undue influence over mrs. 
Peterson. On the 29th of July, 1976, over seven months later, 
the state of Utah intervened. 
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents on 
the validity of the deed because appellant failed to establish 
his allegations by a prepon9erance of the evidence. The court 
also found no undue influence or any unlawful act in negotiating 
for the property, and that respondents were not guilty of defraud-
ing the grantor or the state of utah. 
ARGUmENT 
POINT NO. 
THIS COURT, SITTING IN EQUITY, SHOULD NOT DISTURB 
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT BUT SHOULD SUSTAIN THEm AS 
A PROPER APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE ESTABLISHED FACTS. 
In en action to cancel a deed executed by an alleged 
mental incompetent, or one allegedly mentally weakened and 
acting under undue influence, the presumption is in favor of the 
correctness of the judgment of the trial court and the Supreme 
court end the Supreme court will not disturb the findings of 
the trial court unless they ere against the clear weight of 
evidence. mathews v. Pederson, 204 Okl. 687, 133 P.2d 971(1951). 
(4) 
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The credibility of witnesses and weight of 
evidence in such 
a case is for the trial judge who sees and hears the witnessl 
to determine. Wilson v. Sampson, 91 Cal.App.2nd 9 53, 205 P,; 
753 (1949}. 
"The Supreme Court assumes that the trial court 
bali 
those aspects of the evidence which support · h1s Findings and 
judgment." Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 19?7), 
Cornia v. Cornia, 80 Utah 486, 15 P.2d 631 (1932). The evide 
in this case on appeal should be viewed in light most favorab 
to sustaining the lower court. Brown v. Board of Ed t· uca 1on~ 
morgen co. School Dist., 560 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1977), cutler v, 
Bowen, 10 Cal. App. 2d 31, 51 P.2d 164 (1935). 
POINT NO. II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE GRANTOR HM 
SUFFICIENT MENTAL CAPACITY AT THE TIME OF EXECUTION OF THE ~ 
a, Test of Capacity 
Whether in property law or in Contract law the test 
is the same concerning the mental capacity of one who conveys 
property or contracts with another. It has been stated in 
Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P.2d 142 (1945): 
"The test whether grantor has sufficient mental 
capacity to make a deed is: were mental facilities 
so deficient or impaired that there was not suffic-
ient power to comprehend the subject or the deed, it: 
nature, and its probable consequences, and to act 
with discretion in relation thereto, or with reletim 
to ordinary affairs of life?" 
See also Hatch v. Hatch, 46 utah 218, 148 P. 433 (1914), matt1 
of woodward, 549 P.2d 1207 (Okl. 1976), and Armstrong v. Andn 
4 7 1 p • 2 d 3 2 6 ( o k 1 • 19 6 6 ) • By this test the tria 1 court was ci 
correct in determining carne Peterson competent to execute t~ 
warranty deed. (5) 
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During the time period 1'n h' h W lC the transaction occurred 
mrs. Peterson coherently expressed her purposes 1·n selling the 
property. She wanted respondents to have the home because: 
l. She didn't intend to return there (R.77), 
2. She had worked with them on selling the home at 
e prior ocassion, but it had not come about (R.77), 
3. 
4. 
She "thought a lot of these people" (R.77), 
She wanted someone to have the home that would 
live in it (R.l74), 
5. None of her family needed it (R.l74). 
These statements give great weight to the proposition that mrs. 
Peterson had sufficient power to comprehend what she was doing. 
mrs. Peterson also asked the following questions end 
was advised accordingly: 
1. would her welfare support be terminated upon sale 
of the home? This question was answered by mr. Gowers, 
from the state Welfare Department. He told her if she 
did sell the home, support would not be termineted. (R.77) 
2. What would happen to the money that came from the 
home? (mrs. Peterson, acknowledging that she had given 
the Welfare Department a lien on the home, was concerned 
as to what would happen because of the lien,) This 
question was also answered by mr. Gowers, as he advised 
her that she would receive the first thousand dollars 
to go into a trust to be used for her burial, the balance 
of the proceeds of the sale would go to the welfare 
Department. (R.7B) To this answer mrs. Peterson immed-
iately responded with question #3. 
(6) 
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3. Whst about the money that 111uu ld go 1nto the trus 
This question mrs. Peterson asked of milton Harmon, 
Attorney at Law. She obviously understood that he . ~c: 
an attorney and that he 1110uld know about such matte 
rs. 
mr. Harmon advised her that she would not be able to 
spend it end it would go to a bank and be in trust by 
soma other member of the family. (R.78). 
Clearly mrs. Peterson understood the probable conseque·. 
of her decision to sell her home. By her comments and question, 
she displayed the ability to interact effectively in this trans. 
action "and to act with discretion in relation thereto." 
v. Thomes, supra. 
confronted with the fact that some in her family might 1 
not approve of the sale and if she was sure she wanted to go 
through with it, she replied that "Anne didn't want her to sell 
the property, but it was her property and she 111as going to do 
with it what she wanted to do with it end she wanted to sell it' 
to mr. carter." (R.78) mrs. Peterson was obviously aware of the 
consequences of the sale es to her family relations and also of 
her right as the owner of the property to dispose of it as she 
saw fit. 
The day of the conveyance, upon affirmance that she 
still wanted to sell the property, mrs. Peterson told milton 
Harmon, Exq., who was conducting the transaction, that she 
trusted him and expected that the $1,000.00 for her burial woulo 
be administered properly. (R.84) mrs. Peterson herein shows her 
(7) 
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ability to understand the weighty metter of her funeral expenses 
and administration at the actual time of the conveyance of the 
deed. 
In the opinion of milton Harmon, Esq., as to mrs. 
Peterson's competency to sign the deed, "there was no question 
in my mind that she knew whet she was doing and she wanted the 
home to go to mr. and mrs. Carter." (R.86) 
Respondents respectfully submit that mrs. Peterson 
had the necessary capacity at the time of the execution of the 
deed to convey her property. 
b. Prior and Subsequent Evidence 
In the leading case of Tate v. murphy, 202 Okl. 671, 
217 P.2d 177, 18 ALR.2d 892 (1950), the court settled the basic 
issues involved in the case at Bar. One point that was determined 
by the Court was that while evidence of mantel capacity prior 
and subsequent to the transaction was admissable, evidence of 
mental capacity at the !~mediate time is controlling. See also 
Estey v. Haughian, 112 mont. 36, 113 P.2d 325 (1941), and mathews 
v. Pederson, supra. At trial, in addition to witnesses for 
respondents testifying of mrs. Peterson's coherent conversations; 
five of the appellant's witnesses acknowledged that mrs. Peterson 
did have lucid intervals and intermittent times in which she 
carried on conversations end, understood what was going on. (R.57, 
65,118,130,183) All except one of the appellant's witnesses that 
knew mrs. peterson testified as to her general condition prior 
and subsequent to the actual time the deed was executed. This 
(B) 
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evidence, submitted for the proposition that mrs. Peterson w Bs 
incompetent at the time the deed was t d f execu e , was ound lacki, 
in weight by the trial court; as was her own testimony et trie, 
some two years after the actual act. 
c. Lucid Intervals 
Tate v. murphy, supra, also sets forth an applicable 
ruling on capacity to convey a deed when a person of years mey 
be known to have incompetent moments. The court states: 
"A person of week mentality whose incompetence has not 
been judicially determined may be capable of executin 
a valid conveyance or other contract during lucid in( 
vals in which he is capable of understanding the net: 
and effect of his act, even though he is weak from a!:' 
age and physical infirmities, may be irrational at t~ 
and changeable in his views upon certain subjects, em 
may suffer eccentric hallucinations and express irret1j 
views when sick and under the influence of sedatives,' 
This ruling allows for a rather ~ide range of infirmities as 
discussed by the appellant's witnesses and still the subject 
may have the necessary capacity during a lucid interval to ax~ 
a deed. In the matter of woodward, Supra, another long list ol 
infirmities of the grantor is ruled out as conclusive of inca~ 
ency at the time of conveyance of a deed. The court ruled that 
the testimony of isolated instances of failing memory, testin 
of forgetfulness and wandering of mind, testimony that the gr~ 
was untidy, appearing confused and vague, even physicians' test, 
that the grantor was afflicted with a chronic brain syndrome oi 
senility were all insufficient to warrant setting aside the ~ 
for lack of mental capacity at the time of the conveyance. T~ 
court further stated that "the law does not require the gran~ 
of a deed to be completely competent." The grantor is only 
{9) 
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required to pass the test of capacity: the grantor must have 
the ability to understand the nature and effect of the act at 
the time the conveyance is made. Burgess v. colby, g3 utah 103, 
71 P.2d 185 (1937). 
The policy for this is obvious, If an elderly person 
showed signs of incompetency in any way, their estate would soon 
be subject to disposition by someone else regardless of recovery 
of health, because it could always be proven that at some time 
the subject was incompetent. This would be a rather hard pill 
to swallow. The rule of competency at the time of the conveyance 
allows for the many people that recover from their illnesses, or 
that experience coherent times in between, to still exercise 
their right to dispose of their property as they see fit. 
The respondents respectfully submit that mrs. Peterson 
by her own instigation of the sale and by her questions, conver-
sation, and statements shows her capacity at the time of the 
conveyance as required by the test in Anderson v. Thomas, Supra. 
d. Procedure 
It muat be remembered that incapacity to make a deed 
should be established by a preponderance of the evidence or by 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Tate v. murphy, 
Supra, Armstrong v. Anderson, Supra. In an action to set aside 
a deed on grounds of lack of mental capacity of the ~rantor, 
the presumption is that the grantor had mental capacity to execute 
the deed and the burden of proof is upon the party attacking the 
validity of the deed. matter of woodward, Supra, Wilson v. 
Sampson, Supra, Westover v. Harris, 47 N.m.ll2, 137 P.2d 177(1943), 
(10) 
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Higgins v. Pipkin, 360 P.2d 231 (Okl. 1961), Hackett v. HackE 
429 P.2d 753 (Okl. 1967). As stated by the trial court, this 
burden of proof was not met. 
POINT NO. III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY fOUND THERE llikS NO UNDUE 
INfLUENCE OVER MRS. PETERSON. 
Appellant has alleged that because respondent's gran~ 
mother and mrs. Peterson were friends there was suspicion of 
undue influence. During trial, evidence was found lacking in 
weight to support this allegation. The court in Anderson v. 
Thomas, Supra, held: 
"In suit to cencel a deed for undue influence, 
Plaintiff must show that grantee exercised a 
domineting influence over grantor and thus in-
duced grantor to execute the deed and merely 
raising suspiciion of such influence would not 
be sufficient." 
There was no proof that respondents at any time "axe~ 
a dominating influence over the grantor". Indeed, during the 
conveyance mrs. Peterson spoke quite freely. (R.B4) An attorn1 
was there to oversee the transaction. "Undue influence must b1 
established by clear and convincing evidence." Bradbury v. 
Rasmussen, 16 utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710 (1965). In light of tl 
fact that permission had been received from mrs. Peterson's 
family to sell, why would undue influence be necessary? Since 
mrs. Paterson had instigated the sale and would only receive 
$1,006.00 for her funeral expenses, how would undue influence. 
serve the respondents? Indeed, the allegation is inconsistent 
with the facts. 
Appellant has also alleged that between mrs. Peterson 
and ~espondents there may have been a confidential relationsh~ 
( 11) 
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However, even relatlonships of parent and child do not constitute 
evidence of such confidential relationship as to create a pre-
aumption of fraud or undue influence. Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 
supre. Confidential relationships must be proven. 
Appellant suggests that consideration was nominal and 
proof of undue influence. However, the respondents relied on 
the figure quoted by the State appraiser, as did the State Welfare 
Department. They were not asked to PllY more than the $3,200.00 
appraisal; they were merely asked to pay the appraisal figure. 
According to 23 Am JUR 2d Deeds Sec 66, Et seq. "any 
valuable consideration, even a nominal sum of money, is sufficient 
as between the parties and their privies, to render a deed operative 
to pass title to property." 
Where friendship has been shown to exist between buyer 
and seller it is certainly plausible that the seller may sell 
for a good price. But, even "love and affection are valid 
consideration for the execution of a dead." Crumley v. Smith, 
397 P.2d 119 (Okl. 1964), Pailhe v. Pailhe, 247 P.2d B3B 
(Cal. App. 1952). 
Respondents respectfully submit that appellant has not 
shown undue influence by the weight of evidence. 
POINT NO. i-V 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW APPELLANT TO mAINTAIN A 
VEXATIOUS SUIT IN WHICH HE HAS NO STANDING AND IS NOT THE REAL 
PARTY IN INTEREST. 
To enable one to maintain an action to enforce private 
rights, he must show that he has sustained some injury to his 
personal or property rights, and he must show that he will be 
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benefited by the relief granted. state ex rel. Gebardt v, 
Superior Court for King Co., 15 Wash. 2d 673, 131 P.2d 943 
(1942), State ex rel. Harp v. Wilson, 17 wash. 670,137 P.2d 
105 (1943). An action which is merely vexatious, or which is 
unnecessary and cannot produce any practical results ordinarii 
cannot be maintained. l CJS Actions Sec. 21. 
Respondents contend that thts is merely a vexatious 
claim from which the appellant will receive no benefit. The 
only purpose for rescinding the sale will be to give mrs. Pate· 
·: 
family a chance to purchase the property themselves. This sui: 
is not being brought in the name of mrs. Peterson's family, 
however. It is to rescind a sale of mrs. Peterson's home for n• 
..:0 
As mrs. Peterson had foreseen, she will need to be cared for a: 
a resthome and it would be very unlikely she would ever use ~ 
property again. Therefore, what can mrs. Peterson gain in thi: 
action? Nothing. She has already disposed of the property as 
she desired and she has received all that she can monetarily 
receive regardless of who the purchaser may be. Her practical 
results for bringing this suit are of no benefit to her. 
It has been common to courts of equity for years that 
actions must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest. 59 AM JUR 2d Real Party in Interest Sec. 38 Et seq .. 
' 
The real party in interest provisions are intended to bring bai: 
the court the party rightfully interested in the litigatioo, u 
that only real controversies will be presented and the judgment 
when entered, will be binding and conclusive, and so the dsfeu 
will be saved from further harassment or vexation at the hands 
of other claimants. Anheuser-Bush, Inc. v. Starley, :LB Cal.2d, 
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347, 170 P.2d 448, 166 ALR 198 (1946), Caughey v. George Jenson 
end Sons, 74 Idaho 132, 258 P.2d 357 (1953). 
Respondents submit that the only real party in interest 
is the State of Utah (Welfare Department). The State intervened 
at trial because it would make a difference to them how much 
the property sold for. If the sale is rescinded and the property 
resold for e higher price, the State is the only party that can 
receive benefit. Therefore, the state is the only party that 
has standing and a valid interest in the proceedings. mrs. 
Peterson has received all that she will ever receive from the 
sale of the land and house. 
Respondents respectfully submit that the appellant is 
maintaining a vexatious suit end is not the real party in interest. 
STATE Of UTAH 
The State of Utah accepted their appraiser's figure 
of 53,200.00 for the property, and upon payment by respondents, 
released their lien on the property. (R.l76) The State of Utah 
cannot now claim that they have not received adequate money for 
the release of their lien. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon a review of the facts of this case, the Court 
should sustain the trial judge's findings that mrs. Peterson 
k11ew and understood the nature of the transaction and the conse-
qJences derived by her from a sale of the property. The evidence 
of the proceedings during the actual time of the conveyance 
supports this conclusion. The Court should elsa sustain the trial 
judge's findings that the evidence did not show the respondents 
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exerted undue influence, duress, or committed any unlawful 
act in negotiating for and acquiring subject property. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of November 
~flF 2---ee DliV9CiiiUin, -
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents 
City Office Bldg. 
P.O. Box 176 
Payson, Utah 84651 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondents 
to John L. Valentine, for Howard, Lewis & Petersen,l20 East 
300 North, Provo, Utah 84601 and to mr. Steven Schwendiman, 
Attorney for Intervenor, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, this ~ day of , 1977. 
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